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Thesis Abstract 
 
The mind-body problem is the problem: what is the relationship between mind and 
body? In this project, I claim that the relationship between the experience of pain and specific 
physiological mechanisms is best understood as one of type identity. Specifically, the 
personal experience of pain is an allostatic stress mechanism comprised of interdependent 
nervous, endocrine and immune operations.  
In Chapter One, I provide five reasons to prefer type identity theory of mind to 
dualistic philosophies of mind: it has greater explanatory power; it is more respectful of 
philosophical and folk intuitions about the causal powers of qualia; it is simpler; it is 
supported by the causal closure of the physical; and it is continuous with the natural sciences 
and not separate from them. I describe and challenge four philosophical objections to type 
identity theory of mind: mental states are excluded; mental states disappear; inverted qualia; 
and Saul Kripke‟s claim that type identity theory is false because two individuals could have 
the same mental state while having different physiological states.  
In Chapter Two, I advance a type identity theory of pain supported by a robust 
theoretical schema as the best description of the mind-body puzzle: what is pain? I frame a 
well established multilevel descriptive view of the physiological mechanisms that describe 
pain qualia within the context of advancing theoretical descriptions of the nervous, endocrine 
and immune systems and their functional interdependencies, and descriptions of allostasis, 
homeostasis, stress and wounds, all constrained in turn by complex adaptive systems theory. 
A biological individual is a complex adaptive system coping with a physical and social 
environment, but possessing nested subsystems. Taken together, these descriptions show how 
pain qualia are type identified with specific neurophysiological mechanisms; namely: (1) 
somatosensory qualia of pain, including submodality, intensity, duration and location, are 
best described as the operations of multisubsystem mechanisms in the neospinothalamic tract; 
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(2) negative emotional pain qualia are the operations of multisubsystem mechanisms in the 
paleospinothalamic tract; (3) cognitive pain qualia (pain anticipation) are the operations of 
primary somatosensory cortex (neospinothalamic tract); (4) pain suppression (stress-induced 
analgesia) are the operations the dorsolateral funiculus pathway and opiate systems 
(paleospinothalamic tract). The simplest and most parsimonious metaphysical description of 
these robust relationships is that pain is mechanism. 
In Chapter Three, I advance a novel polyvagal-type identity theory of pain facial 
expression to best explain the explanatory mind-body puzzle: how can pain exist? According 
to some philosophers, assuming neuroscience explains with what mechanistic operations 
being aware of a burning arm pain is type identical, it is still impossible for any 
neuroscientific theory to explain how a specific pain must be correlated with a specific 
mechanism, as opposed to a different mechanism. Thus, there appears to be an explanatory 
gap. In this chapter, I will attempt to bridge the explanatory gap in two ways. First, based on 
the theoretical approach for a type identity theory of pain offered in Chapter Two, I offer a 
polyvagal-type identity theory of the mammalian pain face. I claim type identity theory of 
mind best explains how the gap can be bridged. Type identity theory of mind makes a realist 
assumption that pain is causally responsible for behaviours such as facial pain grimaces and 
screaming. Second, I attempt to bridge the gap by arguing that the supposed gap assumes that 
type identity theory must reconstruct type pain identities as formal derivations from laws of 
nature. Based on actual scientific practice and philosophical considerations concerning 
explanatory levels, I will show that this is a false assumption. Type identity statements that 
successfully emerge from mechanistic pain explanation are between different delineations of 
pain phenomena at the same explanatory level; they are intralevel. Although the explanatory 
gap puzzle correctly shows our incomplete understanding of how pain might be explained by 
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mechanism, the gap merely asserts a practical limit on our present explanatory successes, and 
is not in principle unbridgeable on a priori grounds, as some philosophers claim.  
Eliminative materialists also assert that there is nothing more to pain than mechanism, 
but deny that pain can be type identified with neurophysiological mechanism. The reason is 
that pain does not really exist. Eliminativists propose that pain is part of folk psychology 
which consists of false generalizations („wounding is the cause of pain‟) and false theoretical 
claims („pain always hurts‟). Thus, pain should be eliminated and replaced by an accurate 
neuroscientific successor theory. In Chapter Four, I assess philosophical arguments and data 
for and against eliminative materialism of pain. If eliminativism is correct, then the version of 
type identity theory of pain I propose in this project is strictly false. While pain folk 
psychology has stimulated much psychological research resulting in improved clinical 
outcomes for some pain patients, our own intellectual history reveals that any theory can 
seem successful even when it is radically false. Neuroscience already shows that many folk 
pain claims are false, while the truth of many others is not known. Eliminative materialism 
implies the disquieting consequence that the limit of what can be scientifically eliminated or 
reduced is much closer than we may conventionally think. Alternately, since intellectual 
history also offers modest evidence of theoretical co-existence between type identity theory 
of mind and folk psychology, radical theory change as advocated by eliminativism is just one 
end-point on a continuum of many possibilities. Still, accommodation such as this cannot 
change the sobering insight that all human knowledge is ultimately provisional. This 
realization encourages guarded humility about the ontological status of existing folk and 
scientific pain theories, including the type identity theory of pain, while it fosters an equally 
guarded optimism concerning our future theoretical prospects.  
 
Keywords: allostasis, biological individual, causal closure of the physical, complex 
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adaptive systems, dualism, eliminative materialism, explanatory mind-body gap, folk 
psychology, homeostasis, inverted qualia, mechanism, mechanistic description, mechanistic 
explanation, metaphysical mind-body gap, pain, pain facial expression, qualia, reductionism, 
stress, type identity theory of mind, wounds 
